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CASE COMMENTS
TRADEMARK LAW: CONVENTIONAL CONTROLS IN A
VIRTUAL MARKETPLACE
Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.,
354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004)
B. Michael Bachman, Jr.*
Appellant, an adult entertainment company, owned U.S. trademark
rights in the terms PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE.' Appellee keyed
advertisements of competing adult entertainment businesses and web sites
to appellant's trademarked terms.2 Appellant brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that
Appellee's use of PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE infringed Appellant's
trademarks.3 The district court determined that there was insufficient
evidence to prove consumer confusion with regard to the use of the
trademarked terms and granted Appellee' s motion for summaryjudgment.4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary
judgment of the lower court and HELD, that there existed an issue of
material fact as to whether Appellee's use of trademarked terms created
the likelihood of initial interest confusion under the Lanham Act.5

* Winner of the Journal of Technology Law & Policy Spring 2004 Open Writing
Competition. J.D. Candidate, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank my
parents, Bruce and Nancy Bachman, my brother, Chris, and my sister, Elisabeth Claire, for their
continued love and support.
1. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commununications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.
2004).
2. Id. "Keying" is the process by which Internet search engines allow businesses to target
individuals with interests that may be similar to the product or service the business provides. Id.
at 1022. When the individual searches for a specific term in an Internet search engine which relates
to a specific product or service, a banner ad will appear with the advertisement of a company
offering similar goods or services. Id. at 1022-23.
3. Id. at 1023.
4. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commununications Corp., 55 F. Supp 2d 1070, 1086 (C.D.
Cal. 1999), aff'd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999). The circuit court also determined that Netscape's
use of PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE did not amount to commercial exploitation of PEI's
trademarks. Id. at 1072.
5. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1029.
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When drafting the Lanham Act, Congress envisioned a means of
protecting consumers from confusion while simultaneously allowing
businesses to create and maintain goodwill in their products.6 According
to section 32 of the Lanham Act, a party may be liable for trademark
infringement when it "uses in commerce any... copy of a registered mark
in connection with the sale... or advertising of any goods or services...
[when] such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive." 7 The likelihood of confusion test determines whether the average
consumer would be likely to believe that an infringer's product had a
connection with plaintiff's product.8 Despite the plain language of the
statute, the Lanham Act extends further than mere "point of sale"
confusion. 9 Section 43(a) of the Act extends protection to trademark
owners against customer confusion that creates an initial interest in a
competitor's product." Courts have held initial interest confusion to be a
form of trademark infringement with regard to keyword search terms on
the Internet."
6. See Rachel J. Posner, Manipulative Metatagging: Search Engine Baiting, and Initial
InterestConfusion, 33 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 439, 448 (2000).
7. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1) (1996).
8. See HMH Publ'g Co. v Lambert, 482 F.2d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 1973).
9. See id.Section 32(l) of the Lanham Act establishes the following prohibitions and civil
liabilities relating to federally registered trademarks:
(1)Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil
action by the registrant for civil remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection
(b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless
the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to
be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive...
15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1).
10. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
11. Initial interest confusion assumes that trademark infringement may occur when a
consumer has been confused prior to the purchase of a product. See Posner, supra note 6, at 453
(citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 23:5

CASE COMMENT

The Ninth Circuit addressed the likelihood of confusion using two
similar marks in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats. 12 Plaintiff, a manufacturer
of boats, held trademark rights in the term SLICKCRAFT.' 3 Without
knowledge of plaintiffs registered mark, defendant, also a boat
manufacturer, began using the mark SLEEKCRAFT, for its company
logos. 4 Plaintiff brought suit against defendant alleging trademark
infringement due to a likelihood of confusion. 5 The U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California found for defendant, concluding that the
simultaneous use of the two marks was unlikely to confuse the public. 6
The Ninth Circuit, on appeal, set out to reassess whether defendant's
use of SLEEKCRAFT would likely result in confusion of the public. 17 The
circuit court found that the goods sold by both companies were related,"
but not competitive, 9 and introduced an eight-factor test as the means for
assessing the likelihood of confusion of the two marks.2°
The Sleekcraft court held that the goods sold by both companies were
similar and that the strength of plaintiffs mark was relatively low.2 ' In
addition, the circuit court also found that the two marks met a requisite
level of similarity.22 Next, while the circuit court noted that there was great
difficulty in proving actual confusion, they held that this factor is typically

(4th ed. 1999)). A defendant's use of a trademark owner's mark may confuse consumers at the
initial point of his or her search. See id. at 457.
12. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1979).
13. Id. at 346.
14. Id. The Sleekcraft court indicated that Sleekcraft adopted its name in good faith and
without any knowledge of appellant's use of the similar mark SLICKCRAFT. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 345-46.
17. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 346.
18. Id. at 350. "Related goods" are those goods that a reasonable consumer would believe
came from the same source if marketed using the same or very similar mark. Id. at 348 n. 10.
19. Id. at 348. In order to determine whether two businesses are "competitive," a court will
look to whether the products are being bought by consumers for the same or similar purpose. Id.
The Sleekcraft court found that AMF's boats were used primarily for family activities whereas
Sleekcraft specialized in high speed recreation. Id.
20. Id. at 348-49. The eight Sleekcraft factors that help establish a possibility of confusion
are: (I) strength of the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) evidence
of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely
to be exercised by the purchaser, (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and (8) likelihood of
expansion of the product lines. Id.
21. Id. at350-51.
22. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352. The similarity of the marks was analyzed in terms of sight,
sound, and meaning and the Sleekcraft court held that the marks were similar enough with respect
to all three. Id. at 351-52.
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weighed heavily only when hard evidence is available.23 The circuit court
also analyzed the similar marketing channels used by the parties as well
as their comparable use of many identical sales methods, such as basic
price and advertising.24 The degree of care likely to be exercised by
potential purchasers of boats, as well as the defendant's intent in selecting
the mark, weighed heavily in favor of Sleekcraf.25
Lastly, the Sleekcraft court reviewed the likelihood of expansion of
either company.26 The circuit court found a high probability of a future
competitive relationship, thereby affording the senior user, plaintiff,
greater protection of its mark.27 Ultimately, the circuit court held that the
eight factors favored a ruling for the plaintiff and issued a limited
injunction remanding the case to determine the appropriate relief.2"
After Sleekcraft, courts began using these eight factors in most
traditional trademark infringement cases.29 However, the increased use of
e-commerce imposed a greater burden on courts to determine whether
certain practices employing trademarked terms were a benefit to
consumers or new trademark violations. The Ninth Circuit first conducted
a coherent analysis of metatagging and initial interst confusion, utilizing
the Sleekcraft test, in Brookfleld Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
EntertainmentCorp.3 o
In Brookfield, appellee sought to enjoin appellant, a video rental
company, from using its registered trademark MOVIEBUFF, in its domain

23. Id. at 353.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Sleekcraft court noted that typically, when goods are higher end, such as boats,
buyers are likely to take greater care in their purchasing decisions. Id The Sleekcraft court
determined that Sleekcraft's owner acted in good faith, adopted his mark without knowledge of the
Slickcraft mark, and made no attempt to capitalize on the possible resulting confusion. Id. at 354.
26. Id. A strong possibility of expansion on the part of either party will tend to accord a ruling
against the infringing party. Id. The Sleekcraft court determined that expansion could lead to direct
competition, thus unfairly prejudicing the senior trademark owner. Id.
27. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Eclipse Assocs., Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that evidence that cleaning products, laundry folding equipment, and industrial heating
equipment used the name "eclipse" was inadmissible in trademark suit involving use of the term
"eclipse" by two computer companies); Matrix Motor Co., Inc. v. Toyota Jidosha Kibushiki Kaisha,
290 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the use of the term MATRIX was
unlikely to cause confusion between a passenger car manufacturer and a custom-made racing car
manufacturer).
30. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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name and metatags.3" At the lower level, appellee obtained a preliminary
injunction against appellant.3 2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
judgment barring appellant from using appellee's mark, MOVIEBUFF.33
The Brookfield court used the eight Sleekcraft factors to determine whether
the public was likely to be confused by use of appellee's trademarked term

in metatags.34 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the traditional
Sleekcraft factors were not adequate for determining the issue involving
metatags. 5
Based on available case law and the letter of the Lanham Act, the
circuit court concluded that initial interest confusion was likely to occur.3 6
This initial interest confusion would allow appellant to capitalize on the
goodwill associated with appellee's products, the very harm against which
the Lanham Act protects trademark owners.37 The Brookfield court
concluded that the similar marks would likely lead to consumer confusion
and a preliminary injunction against appellant would be an adequate
remedy.3"
After the decision in Brookfield, courts seemed to follow the rationale
used by the Ninth Circuit.3 9 Courts viewed metatagging of trademarked
31. Id. Metatags can be equated to virtual library card catalogs wherein information about
a particular web site's contents can be located. Id. at 1045. Web designers use metatags in search
engines so that Internet users will have access to pertinent web sites based on the terms used in a
search request. Id.
32. Id. at 1043. Brookfield alleged that West Coast's use of its trademark violated sections
32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15. U.S.C.A. § 1114, 1125(a). Id.
33. Id. at 1043. The Brookfield court enjoined West Coast from using the trademarked term
MOVIEBUFF, in any manner, especially advertising, promoting, and metatagging. Id. The
Brookfield court also barred West Coast's use of the domain name moviebuff.com and any other
similar terms likely to cause confusion between the two products at issue. Id. The banned terms
included "@moviebuff.com" or "moviebuff.com." Id. Brookfield first became aware of West
Coast's intention to use the "MOVIEBUFF" mark when it learned that West Coast registered for
the domain name, "moviebuff.com" subsequent to Brookfield's actual use of the mark. Brookfield,
174 F.3d at 1042.
34. Id. at 1054.
35. Id.
36. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. The Brookfield court nevertheless conducted an exhaustive
analysis of the facts using the Sleekcraft factors. Id. at 1054-61.
37. Id. at 1062. The Brookfield court related an example illustrating the misappropriation of
goodwill wherein Mobil sued Pegasus Petroleum for utilizing "Pegasus" as a symbol of its product
and company, contending that consumers would be confused between Pegasus's new symbol and
Mobil's flying horse symbol. Id. at 1063 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818
F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987)).
38. Id. at 1066-67.
39. See generally SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 562-63 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding
that the Lanham Act was violated when an assembler adopted an Internet web site with same name
as a kit manufacturer's product); The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants v.
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terms as an intentional method to lure Internet users to web sites of
competitors.4" Furthermore, manipulative metatagging was found
sufficient to cause consumer confusion and thus violate the Lanham Act.4'
The commercialization of the Internet and, more specifically, the use
of metatagging and keying, have imposed a new burden on courts. While
these innovative practices are a benefit to consumers, they may also
constitute trademark infringement.42 As courts have endeavored to employ
traditional standards of trademark law, most have failed in their attempt to
develop a bright line rule to govern the widespread use of keyword banner
advertising in the Internet marketplace. 43 For example, in enforcing the
Lanham Act, no court can rigidly follow the guiding factors introduced by
Sleekcraft.
In the instant case, the Playboy court attempted to reconcile the
discrepancy between conventional trademark infringement and
infringement in the context of newly emerging technology. 44 Appellant
contended that appellee used its trademarks to actively induce initial
interest confusion amongst its consumers. 45 Appellant further alleged that
appellee misappropriated the goodwill appellant's marks had accumulated
by leading consumers to competitors' web sites.46
A flexible use of the eight Sleekcraft factors was necessary in this
context and the instant court turned first to an analysis of the evidence
proving actual confusion.47 Expert testimony on behalf of appellant
concluded that consumers were likely to assume appellant's sponsorship
of advertisements that resulted from a search of the terms PLAYBOY and

Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that defendant's use of
"NYSSCPA" in its "nysscpa.com" Internet domain name and as a meta-tag was infringing).
However, it was evident that looser infringement standards, deemed desirable by many given the
vastness of the Internet, would be at odds with those seeking to protect marks in all mediums. See
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits ofFree-Ridingin Cyberspace: TrademarkLiabilityfor
Metatagging,33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 277-79 (1997).
40. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066-67.
41. Id. at 1064.
42. See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.
2004).
43. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062; Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D.
Cal. 1998) (holding that defendant's use in metatags of registered marks PLAYBOY and
PLAYMATE was permissible).
44. See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025-26.
45. Id. Evidence was produced in court that tended to show that Defendants require adultoriented companies to link their ads to Appellant's trademarked terms. Id. at 1029.
46. Id. at 1025.
47. Id. at 1026.

20041
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PLAYMATE. 4' The instant court determined that summary judgment was
not proper and explored the seven remaining Sleekcraft factors.49
The instant court found that the sixth Sleekcraft factor, the type of
goods and anticipated degree of consumer care, weighed heavily in favor
of appellant.5" It determined that similar products are likely to divert the
attention of consumers who may be seeking specific adult-oriented
products or companies on the Internet." In addition, the degree of
consumer care exhibited in seeking adult-oriented products was found to
be relatively low, thereby increasing the likelihood of consumer
confusion.52
The relevance of the seventh Sleekcraft factor, defendant's intent in
selecting a mark for use, depended heavily on the effects of the Internet
and marketing techniques such as keying and metatagging.53 The instant
court determined that while there was no indication that appellee had the
direct intent to confuse, the company directly profited from the subsequent
consumer confusion.54 Appellee's use of "click-through" rates as a
marketing tool to lure advertisers back to their services pointed to the
likelihood that appellee's use of appellant's trademark was to generate
confusion amongst the advertiser's products and those of appellant."
Further evidence of intent was discernible in appellee's refusal to remove
the trademarked terms from keyword lists even when asked to do so by
advertisers using their service.56 Judge Berzon, in his concurrence, noted
that the issue facing the instant court was one of a much more serious
nature than that faced in Brookfleld.5 7 The instant case concerned

48. Id. at 1025.
49. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1027.
50. Id. at 1028.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1028-29.
54. Playboy,354 F.3d at 1029. The Playboy court stated that if a defendant has the intent to
confuse consumers, this intent can be used as probative evidence of the likelihood of future
confusion. Id. at 1028.
55. Id. at 1023. The instant court explained that after searching in a search engine, results
were displayed both in text and graphics (as in the nature of the keyed advertisements). Id. The
advertisements are even labeled, "click here." Id. The ratio between the number of times an
advertisement appears as the result of a search and the number of times consumers actually click
on them are known as click-through rates. Id. These rates are cited to potential clients in an effort
to convince them to advertise with a particular search engine. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023.
56. Id. at 1029.
57. Id. at 1035 (Berzon, J., concurring).
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deliberate deceit of consumers who were diverted by the search engine
from their destination by the use of keyed advertisements. 8
Until Brookfield, courts had only Sleekcraft-like factors to guide them
in determining trademark protection. Increased use of the Internet for
information and commerce has stripped trademark owners of control over
use of their marks. The controversy over trademark infringement rights on
the Internet produces two very distinct arguments. 59 Many commentators
argue that the broad protection afforded to trademark owners in the context
of the Lanham Act should extend directly to the Internet.6 Others maintain
that the free-flowing exchange of ideas and plethora of consumer choice
on the Internet should be encouraged through diminishing traditional
protections afforded to trademark owners.6 The instant court's analysis
represents the current struggle to classify the use of trademarked terms in
the context of search engine indexing.62
The Lanham Act has provided a broad framework wherein most
trademarked items remain safe.6 3 The goal of the Ninth Circuit in the
instant case was simply to enforce the letter and nature of the Lanham
Act.' 4 The instant court was forced to consider specific facts and
circumstances which are novel to cyberspace, let alone that of a court of
law.
In an attempt to enforce the Lanham Act using traditional and familiar
measures, the instant court looked to the Sleekcraft factors to determine
whether a likelihood of confusion existed.65 However, Sleekcraft involved
a visible, physical mark which was unintentionally and inexactly
reproduced.66 In the instant case, appellee's use of the appellant's marks
to automatically key banner advertisements of competing adult
entertainment companies was an intentional use of an exactly reproduced
mark with the probable result of consumer confusion.67 While the instant
court relied on Sleekcraft and its eight factors to measure likelihood of
confusion, the analysis as applied to Internet search engines seemed
inadequate.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. (Berzon, J. concurring).
See O'Rourke, supra note 39, at 277-79.
See id. at 278-79.
See id. at 278-79.
See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1020.
See generally Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. 1114(1).
See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1020, 1024.
Id. at 1026-29.
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (1979).
Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1029.

CASE COMMENT

The Brookfield court was the first to apply the Lanham Act and
Sleekcraft factors to search engine metatagging.68 Brookfield held that
metatags were used by search engines and businesses to manipulate
Internet users into visiting web sites they were never originally seeking.69
In addition, the Brookfield court determined that metatag usage allowed
competitors to profit from the goodwill associated with another.7 ° With
this precedent in place, the instant court fashioned a logical connection
between trademarked terms in metatags and the use of those terms in
keyed advertisements.71 The appellee in Brookfield benefited from the
goodwill associated with appellant's mark by using the mark in metatags
and luring consumers away from the trademark owner's services.72
Likewise, the instant court determined that consumers searching for
appellant's sites might conclude that unlabeled advertisements, which
appeared as a result of searching for appellant's trademarked terms, were
associated with appellant."
The instant court's use of Brookfield as a guiding post was its second
attempt to return to conventional standards to shape a new ruling on keyed
advertising.74 The Lanham Act's protection does not give trademark
owners exclusive rights to their marks. 5 The goal of trademark law has
always been to protect consumers and to shield entrepreneurs from the
misappropriation of the goodwill they have established in their products.76

68. See Posner, supra note 6, at 480.
69. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999).
70. Id.
71. See generally Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1020.
72. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064. The Brookfleld court illustrated the misappropriation of
goodwill and likelihood of initial interest confusion using the following metaphor: Using another's
trademark in one's metatags can be likened to posting a sign with another's trademark in front of
one's commercial establishment. Id. Consumers will be confused by the use of the mark and stop,
all along believing the products being offered are probably those of the trademark owner. Id. Upon
finding a competitor's product, even consumers who prefer the trademark owner's product may find
a continued search unwarranted because the competitor's product will suffice. Id. In addition,
Sleekcraft's consumer level of care factor is relevant here. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d
341,353 (1979). Consumer care in Brookfield as well as in the instant case was held to be generally
quite low. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1028; Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1060.
73. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025.
74. See id. The instant court's tools of analysis were limited to section 32 of the Lanham Act,
Brookfield, and the Sleekcrafl factors. Id.
75. See Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. 1114(1). According to the instant court, the core
element of trademark infringement is likelihood of confusion, not simple similarity. Playboy, 354
F.3d at 1024.
76. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114.
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The instant court seemed determined not to allow Brookfield's analysis to
handcuff them as they faced a newer, more complex issue.
Brookfield limits a finding of infringement by initial interest confusion
to situations where the parties involved are competitors." As the instant
case revealed, Brookfield may not provide standards suitable for the
Internet's virtual marketplace, and is more suited to brick and mortar
environments. The Internet is a forum where all web sites are competing
for the attention of consumers. In the instant case, appellant's marks were
infringed, not by a competing adult-oriented entertainment company, but
by a search engine seeking to make a profit on advertisements for
competing adult-oriented entertainment companies.78 Subjecting all
participants of World Wide Web commerce to the standards of the
Lanham Act is likely to be a judicial necessity. However, the instant case
demonstrates that the use of concrete, established precedent such as
Sleekcraft and Brookfield in the ever-evolving world of cyberspace is
difficult and inadequate.
The instant case presented a situation where appellant's potential
customers were led falsely and directly to a competitor's site, while at least
79
initially believing their search for appellant's material was successful.
The fact that consumer care with respect to such purchases is supposedly
low should be of no consequence.80 The instant case reveals that
purposeful and deceitful misdirection is now a commonly employed
method of the virtual marketplace. Courts cannot be limited by established
standards when it comes to electronic commerce. As the Internet continues
its rapid growth, courts must analyze situations on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether confusion may exist, even in light of consumer
progression and sophistication. Until Congress enacts legislation dealing
specifically with trademark infringement in the context of e-commerce,
courts will have no choice other than to apply traditional standards of
precedent to each new case brought before them.

77.
78.
79.
80.

See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1036.
Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1035-36 (Berzon, J., concurring).
Id. at 1025-26.
Id. at 1035.

